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PERFORMING PARTY AUTONOMY 
FLEUR JOHNS* 
[T]he legal infrastructure of deals provides . . . a window through which [one] can 
view, or imagine, the soul of the company.1 
Supposing that ‘the soul’ was an attractive and mysterious idea which philosophers, 
rightly, gave up only with reluctance—perhaps what they’re now learning to exchange 
for it is even more attractive . . . life and corporeality, through which, over which, 
beyond which a tremendous, inaudible river seems to flow . . . .2 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The “private” in private international law implies that the primary stimuli to 
this law’s development are the spontaneous, personal activities and preferences 
of nongovernmental legal or natural persons. On its face, private international 
law is concerned with people or entities holidaying on cruise ships, adopting 
children abroad, buying foreign goods, and entering into commercial contracts 
with transboundary dimensions. The sense that private international law is 
properly referable to the “private” (read: civil, familial, and commercial) desires 
of individual persons (natural or legal) is encapsulated, in particular, by the 
notion of party autonomy in contractual choice of law and choice of forum.3 In 
contracts with indicia of internationalism, an actual or inferred choice on 
questions of applicable law and forum is supposed to bring clarity and certainty 
to the confusion posed by multijurisdictional overlap, allowing at least some 
regulatory rubber to meet the parties’ chosen road. 
Legal devolution to party choice in these areas has nonetheless long 
provoked concerns about regulatory evasion, the subversion of sovereign 
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 1. Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1585 (2006). 
 2. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, WRITINGS FROM THE LATE NOTEBOOKS 27 (Kate Sturge trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) (1885). 
 3. See, e.g., Michael Whincop & Mary Keyes, Putting the ‘Private’ Back into Private International 
Law: Default Rules and the Proper Law of the Contract, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 515, 542 (1997) (“We 
consciously endorse . . . an approach [that is] most consistent with the normative principle of party 
autonomy, and most supportive of private ordering and exchange facilitation. As our title suggests, it is 
a way to put the ‘private’ back into private international law.”). 
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authority, and disregard for the legitimate interests of governments.4 
Accordingly, the delineation of the proper ambit of party autonomy, and the 
extent to which it should be subordinated to mandatory law or public-policy 
principles, preoccupies much private-international-law scholarship.5 In recent 
decades, scholarly attention to the scope of party autonomy in contractual 
matters has been particularly intense regarding contract-making by 
transnational corporations,6 the scenario on which this article focuses. 
The influence borne by party autonomy in private international law is 
discernible not only in scholarly argument that explicitly favors or frets about 
the prioritization of private choices of law and forum. It is evident too in how 
private parties’ contractual choices feature in private-international-law 
scholarship. In both scholarship celebratory of party autonomy and scholarship 
anxious about its impact in private international law, the negotiated enactment 
of contractual choice is envisaged as a preregulatory or postregulatory moment. 
Parties are presumed more or less capable of standing back from the laws and 
jurisdictions with which they are potentially engaged, assessing the likely 
outcomes of those engagements, and contracting around the impacts they wish 
to avoid.7 For the purposes of choosing law and forum, each contracting party is 
gathered more or less into a single consciousness, vested with coherence and 
directive vision. The scenario whereby two or more contracting parties so 
vested decide “autonomously” on law and forum is cast as either the 
appropriate testing ground for private international law’s efficiency, or a 
potentially dangerous arrogation of lawmaking power properly vested in 
democratic institutions of government. From either slant, scholarly analysis 
tends to proceed from the moment of a choice having been made, or toward the 
possibility of its making. Even those who rail against the rise and abuse of 
private power seem to take the seamless interiority of each “autonomous” party 
 
 4. See, e.g., E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931) (“People cannot by 
agreement substitute the law of another place; they may of course incorporate any provisions they wish 
into their agreements—a statute like anything else—and when they do, courts will try to make sense 
out of the whole, so far as they can. But . . . [s]ome law must impose the obligation, and the parties have 
nothing whatever to do with that.” See also 2 ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY, 359–431 (2d ed. 1960). 
 5. See, e.g., Ama S. Bekow, The Illusory Choice: Examining the Illusion of “Choice” in Choice of 
Law Provisions—A Country Study Exploring One Aspect of Foreign Investment in the Caribbean, 42 
HOW. L.J. 505, 511 (1999) (“[T]he success of any choice of law system[ ] can and should be measured by 
the degree of autonomy that contracting parties have to determine which law would govern their cross 
border contracts.”). See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for 
Reasonableness, 245 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 255–91 (1994). Lowenfeld is among those skeptical of 
“viewing private controversies as if they involved deep-seated national interests.” Id. at 291. 
 6. See, e.g., Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority and International Investment Law, 20 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 465, 505 (2005); Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory 
Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 
219–20 (2002). 
 7. As Annelise Riles points out, this capacity for disengaged choice is also assumed by much legal-
realist scholarship on private international law in its “technoscientific” mode. Annelise Riles, A New 
Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 1007–08 
(2005). 
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more or less for granted. Likewise, as a matter of private-international-law 
doctrine, provided that a written choice of law or forum is deemed the true 
choice of a given party (free from duress, mala fides, or fraud), the actual 
making of a contractual choice of law or forum becomes virtually unreadable.8 
Scholarly and doctrinal projections of choices of law and forum as 
deliberate, measured, and coherent decisions, upon which normative constraints 
become operative only in anticipation of or after the fact, sit rather uneasily 
with this writer’s experience of legal practice. This unease is particularly acute 
in relation to the corporate enactment of “autonomous” choice. The limits of 
the traditional conception of contracting as a meeting of minds have long been 
highlighted in studies of the standard form.9 Yet my sense is that, in relation to 
corporate decisionmaking, similar concerns might be raised outside the context 
of standard-form, or boilerplate,10 contracting.11 Even when projections of 
corporate integrity and autonomy are framed as necessary fictions (as they are 
by leading commentators on private international law),12 they are problematic 
by virtue of the types of inquiry and points of negotiation they foreclose. 
Accordingly, it is this interior—the terrain of autonomous choice-making—on 
which this article focuses. To do so is to work in a viral mode within the 
pragmatic sensibility that is the default posture of private international law 
today.13 
Admittedly (and as discussed further in part II), the literature on transaction 
costs and third-party externalities has, on occasion, pointed toward the moment 
 
 8. See generally PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 66–71, 92–97, 104–
21 (1999). Nygh rationalizes private international law’s tunnel vision in this respect as follows: “The 
reason for the . . . exclusion of evidence of pre- and post-contractual behavior is certainty, a policy 
which is understandable where the agreement between the parties has been reduced to writing.” Id. at 
112. 
 9. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (2006); 
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. 
REV. 629 (1943). 
 10. The contemporary sense of the term boilerplate is derived from the nineteenth-century practice 
of stamping or casting units of text onto large, flat metal plates (of the kind otherwise used in making 
steam boilers), then distributing these prepared plates to newspapers throughout the United States as 
“filler” for their respective editions. Carol Bast, A Short History of Boilerplate, 5 SCRIBES J. OF LEG. 
WRITING 155, 155–56 (1994). 
 11. Annelise Riles observes that inequities and power imbalances (of a sort that contract law is 
often ill-equipped to see) are observable as much in negotiated parts of the contracts that govern 
international derivatives transactions as they are in their standardized portions. Annelise Riles, 
Collateral Damage: Global Private Governance, Legal Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the State 34 
(Sept. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 12. See, e.g., id.; MICHAEL J. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 167 (2001) (observing that “corporations are accorded legal personality 
[recognized as a reification] for pragmatic reasons, not ontological ones”). 
 13. For discussion of pragmatic tendencies in private-international-law scholarship, see Riles, supra 
note 11, at 3–7, 24–31; Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731 
(1990); Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Choice of Law Revolution in the Courts: Today and 
Tomorrow, 298 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 413–15 (2002). On “viral” critique, see Duncan Kennedy, The 
Paradox of American Critical Legalism, 3 EUR. L.J. 359, 359, 372, 376–77 (1997). 
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and mode of parties’ choice.14 Public-choice literature has sought to redescribe 
legal decisionmaking in terms attentive to “rent-seeking,” framing parties’ 
autonomous preferences within networks of influence and interest.15 Behavioral 
law and economics has inserted insights about actual human behavior into the 
modeling of choice.16 Sociologically informed studies of contract law have 
replaced “elegant models” of contract practice with complex, empirical 
pictures.17 However, to the extent that these approaches have been deployed in 
relation to private international law, the concern of their proponents has 
generally been to invest that law with greater accuracy, predictability, or 
efficiency.18 Literature of this kind seeks, in other words, to consolidate the 
“facticity” and integrity with which acts of choice—and the so-called 
autonomous parties that make them—are already invested, albeit in a more 
sophisticated fashion. 
In contrast, the concern of this article is the politics of a prevailing tendency 
to frame the power of transnational corporate agents as resolved and decisive in 
relation to contractual choices of law and forum, and to regard law as the direct 
expression of that power, or its necessary antithesis. This configuration merits 
question because it anticipates—and, as it were, guarantees—the necessity of 
that with which it sometimes purports to contend: private (corporate) rule. The 
effect is at least partially akin to that described by Judith Butler in relation to 
gender: “[W]hat we take to be an ‘internal’ feature of ourselves [or, in this case, 
of the global legal order] is one that we anticipate and produce through 
certain . . . acts . . . .”19 
By way of launching an investigation into private international law’s 
production of corporate choice, part II of this article explains the significance of 
party autonomy in private-international-law scholarship and doctrine. As part 
 
 14. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, 
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995). 
 15. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability System, 
80 GEO. L.J. 617, 639–42 (1992) (exploring the “structural incentive[s]” that states face to circumscribe 
parties’ choice of law); Erin A. O’Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of 
Contractual Choice of Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551, 1572–86 (2000). 
 16. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). Reza Dibadj argues for the extension of these insights 
into an “organizational behavioral economics” of the corporate firm. Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the 
Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1459 (2005). 
 17. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of 
Contract, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 507, 508–12 (1977) (contrasting a “classical model” of contracting that 
“starts with the assumption that entrepreneurs need to plan and deal with risk” and that “[t]hey do so 
by carefully drafting contracts, which they understand and agree to” with an empirical picture that 
“shows that business people in all societies compromise differences rather than invoke contract 
norms”). 
 18. See, e.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 9, at 1172 (“[T]o recognize the reality of how these 
documents evolve and how certain terms can get forgotten but nevertheless [be] retained in the 
contracts will help courts reach a more accurate understanding of the reality of what the contract is 
intended to mean.”); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151 (2000). 
 19. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE xv–xvi (2006). 
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of that scene-setting, part II recalls the contributions of legal realists to private 
international law, the work of Walter Wheeler Cook in particular. In so doing, 
this article presents a somewhat heterodox account of Cook’s contributions to 
the discipline. Far from his being read as one more advocate of doctrinal 
deference to autonomous choice,20 Cook’s interest in parties’ choices of law and 
forum is read here as related to his interest in exploring the effect and limits of 
private “legislation.”21 It is in that light that this article casts Cook’s work as 
helpful in grappling with the enactment of private-international-law “choice” in 
corporate settings. 
Claiming that the performance of choice comprises an underinterrogated 
backdrop to private-international-law scholarship, part III of this article 
replaces this seamless backdrop with another scene: it redescribes corporate 
parties’ choices of law and forum in terms of a quasi-ethnographic rendering of 
their making.22 In that redescription, the following arguments are made: First, 
the exercise of “autonomous choice” in selecting a contract’s applicable law and 
dispute-resolution forum in an international corporate transaction is 
normatively overdetermined.23 That is, the factors shaping the enactment of 
choice in a complex corporate transaction remain normatively irreducible to the 
apparently determined choices attributed to those entities that are parties to 
 
 20. For such a reading, see CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 155 (Roger C. 
Cramton, David P. Currie & Herma H. Kay eds., 3d ed. 1981) (“The rule permitting parties to select 
the law to govern the validity of a contract has many adherents, including Cook”); Symeonides, supra 
note 13, at 37 (“Cook thought of the choice-of-law problem as one of choosing between competing 
rules”). 
 21. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
393–98 (1942) [hereinafter COOK 1942] (challenging the argument attributed to Professors Ernest 
Lorenzen, Joseph Beale, and Herbert Goodrich that “this kind of ‘legislation’—if one calls it that—is 
never permitted under our legal system . . .”). Insofar as Cook did endorse giving effect to parties’ 
“intention” with respect to choices of law and forum (and Cook always couched the word “intention” 
in scare quotes as if to alert readers to its constructed nature), he contended that choice should be 
limited to the law of some state with which the transaction in question has some substantial connection, 
and warned that the public-policy test to which this “intention” must further be subject must be “kept 
constantly in mind.” Id. at 412, 418. Note also that Cook’s endorsement of a rule deferring to the 
expressed intention of the parties was always expressed as relative to the more problematic (as he saw 
it) “place of contracting” theory. Cook conditioned this endorsement further by suggesting that it 
would be meaningful only “[i]f such a brief set of rules is thought desirable.” Id. at 419. As Annelise 
Riles notes, Cook himself had little interest in producing or validating a brief set of rules. Riles, supra 
note 7, at 1030. 
 22. I am indebted to Annelise Riles for encouraging me to see this account in such a light. For this 
sort of ethnographic work, see, for example, ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000); 
Bruno Latour, Scientific Objects and Legal Objectivity, in LAW, ANTHROPOLOGY, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING PERSONS AND THINGS 73 (Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy 
eds., 2004). 
 23. On “overdetermination,” from which the foregoing and later usages in this article are 
extrapolated, see Louis Althusser, Contradiction and Overdetermination, in FOR MARX 87 (Ben 
Brewster trans., 2005); Sigmund Freud, The Aetiology of Hysteria, in THE FREUD READER 96, 108 
(Peter Gay ed., 1995); Sigmund Freud, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (“Dora”), in THE 
FREUD READER, supra, at 203. On the implications of “overdetermination” in Althusser’s work, and 
the export (and transformation) of the term, see William S. Lewis, The Under-Theorization of 
Overdetermination in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 4 BORDERLANDS E-JOURNAL, Oct. 2005, 
http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol4no2_2005/lewis_overdetermination.htm (last visited May 28, 2008). 
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each contract in question and the principles of private international law that 
purport to uphold or constrain those choices. Second, corporate parties’ 
enactments of autonomous preference tend to be structured in particular, 
patterned ways. These recurrent structures or patterns—and the allocations of 
power and resources they effect—merit as much questioning as is leveled at the 
private-international-law principles by which parties’ choices are circumscribed 
in advance or after the fact. Legal realists such as Robert Hale long ago 
observed that “decisions made [by corporations, for instance] are a function of 
the decision-making structure, [such that] that structure becomes the critical, if 
not always conspicuous, policy issue.”24 In the first half of the twentieth century, 
Walter Wheeler Cook brought that insight to bear on private international 
law.25 Drawing inspiration from the work of Hale and Cook, this article depicts a 
decisionmaking structure in which party autonomy gets performed (as 
contractual choices of law and forum), seeking to bring the policy issues 
embedded in that structure into contention. 
The name given in part III to the performative emplacement of party 
autonomy is “the deal.” In the parlance of practitioners and industry rags 
concerned with cross-border commercial investment, the deal is a summary 
term for a set of private-law contracts, public-law permits and concessions, 
equity investments, loans, bonds, security interests, insurance policies, rating 
agency grades, debt pricing and terms, national economic and political agendas, 
construction plans, environmental impacts, professional identities, and industry 
“firsts” (or revisited precedents).26 One might also think of the deal as an abode, 
a workplace, or a polity divided in and against itself. The making of parties’ 
contractual choices, for a given state or nonstate law and a state- or nonstate-
dispute-resolution forum, is re-cast here as one enacted in, by, and for the deal. 
The story told here is of the performance of choices of law and forum from the 
perspective of corporate lawyers working “in” and “on” a cross-border deal. 
Having painted a new backdrop for reflection on party autonomy in private 
international law, this article focuses, in part IV, upon recent debate concerning 
the capacity of corporate parties to elect by contract to subject themselves to 
nonstate norms (particularly merchant law or usage, or lex mercatoria), in 
preference to norms prescribed by state institutions (courts and legislatures). If 
the autonomous choice of corporate parties is read as the product of a deal and 
the deal is read as a hypernormative site, then questions arise before the 
 
 24. Warren J. Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and its Legal Bases: The Legal 
Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261, 351 (1973). 
 25. See generally COOK 1942, supra note 21; Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of 
the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924) [hereinafter Cook 1924]. 
 26. See, e.g., Latin American Oil & Gas Deal of the Year 2007, PROJECT FIN. MAG., Feb. 2008, at 1. 
Cf. Doreen McBarnet, Transnational Transactions: Legal Work, Cross-Border Commerce and Global 
Regulation, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES 98, 
99 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002). McBarnet “turns the spotlight on the legal construction of global 
deals . . . . from the pragmatic perspective of practising lawyers working for specific clients.” See also 
Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corporate Transactions into the Law School Classroom, 2002 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 475 (2002). 
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question when or whether to subject those parties to nonstate norms or state 
law. Additional, pertinent questions for this debate include the following: How, 
and with what effects, does deal-constraint get effaced by deal-freedom in 
scholarly representations of an “autonomous” contractual choice of law? What 
“choices,” norms, or blind-spots are enacted in this freedom-heavy 
configuration of the choice of law in international commercial transactions? 
What are the implications of an overdetermination of the arena of choice for 
the presumed link between party autonomy and political and economic 
liberalism? What gets ruled in and ruled out when one locates choice-of-law-
related questions after the deal? These are the sorts of questions that this article 
considers or introduces for subsequent consideration. 
II 
PARTY AUTONOMY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL  
LAW: THE DISCRETE CHARM OF THE CONTRACTING PARTY 
In private international law, “party autonomy” in relation to contract is 
generally taken to refer to the entitlement of parties to select the law under 
which their contractual terms will be interpreted and the jurisdiction in which 
those terms will, in the event of a dispute, be enforced.27 Numerous stories have 
been told of the nineteenth-century enthronement of private parties as primary 
“legislators” for their contractual relations.28 Peter Nygh has observed, for 
instance, that “[w]hereas originally [a contract] was seen as an obligation 
imposed on the parties by the general law arising out of their transaction, it 
came to be seen as an obligation created by the parties themselves.”29 Nygh 
regarded it as one consequence of this shift that private international law in 
most Anglo-Commonwealth, North American, and Western European 
jurisdictions came to authorize parties to “exit” the realm of an otherwise 
applicable legal regime, and the purview of an otherwise competent court, as a 
matter of contractual choice. Thus, in 1999, Nygh wrote: “Today the freedom of 
the parties to an international contract to choose the applicable law and its 
corollary, to choose the forum, judicial or arbitral, for the settlement of their 
disputes arising out of such contract is almost universally acknowledged.”30 
Equally well-documented is the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century assault, by legal-realist scholars, on the idea of liberty upon which the 
foregoing configuration of contractual autonomy relies.31 Robert Hale, among 
others, argued that freely negotiated, voluntary, contractual exchanges 
amounted to complex networks of mutual coercion. Parties’ contractual choices, 
 
 27. NYGH, supra note 8, at 1, 13. 
 28. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979). 
 29. NYGH, supra note 8, at 7 (footnote omitted). 
 30. Id. at 13. 
 31. See generally AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 76–120 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993); 
BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE 
FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 29–70 (1998). 
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Hale showed, were conditioned by the unavailability of alternative choices.32 
The availability or unavailability of such alternatives was a consequence, in 
part, of the law of contract’s (among other laws’) unevenly disbursing 
entitlements.33 Accordingly, the free-market system of contractual freedom was, 
according to Hale, “not a system of liberty at all, but a complicated network of 
restraints, imposed in part by individuals, but very largely by the government 
itself at the behest of some individuals on the freedom of others, and at the 
behest of others on the freedom of the ‘some.’”34 “[I]n a sense,” Hale argued, 
“each party to [a] contract, by the threat to call on the government to enforce 
his power over the liberty of the other, imposes the terms of the contract on the 
other.”35 That parties’ contractual choices were not generally experienced by the 
parties themselves as products of coercion was, Hale contended, solely a matter 
of social convention.36 Of this “system,” Hale concluded, 
What in fact distinguishes this counterfeit system of ‘laissez-faire’ from paternalism is 
not the absence of restraint, but the absence of any conscious purpose on the part of 
the officials who administer the restraint, and of any responsibility or unanimity on the 
part of the numerous [property] owners [or holders of other tangible or intangible 
entitlements] at whose discretion the restraint is administered.37 
All that could be extrapolated from the principle of party autonomy in 
contractual matters, according to Hale’s reading, was a conscious or 
unconscious normative commitment on the part of lawmakers (public and 
private) to maintain, as far as possible, the existing distribution of background 
constraints and entitlements. Given the ubiquity of unacknowledged coercion, 
the extant regime of legal rights and prohibitions could not be deduced from 
any plausible notion of party autonomy in the abstract. 
Legal-realist critiques of deductive legal reasoning in general, and 
contractual freedom in particular, were extended into the private-international-
law field by Walter Wheeler Cook. Like Hale, Cook set out to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of generic explanations for decisions upon which courts arrived in 
particular instances. Focusing on decisions made by courts, rather than on the 
reasons given for those decisions, Cook argued that U.S. case law on private-
 
 32. Robert L. Hale, Value and Vested Rights, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 524–25 (1927) (“The law 
places on the staff no legal duty to work for this employer . . . but it does impose various other 
restrictions on their liberty which have an indirect effect of making them seek jobs. . . . The legal 
restraints on their conduct . . . constitute the indirect sanction which drives them into the employ of the 
particular factory owner.”). 
 33. Robert L. Hale, Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, 15 AM. LAB. 
LEGIS. REV. 155, 156–57 (1925). Hale attacks “[t]he idea . . . that at common law we all have equal 
rights, whether of personal liberty or of property” with the observation that “[t]he common law 
interferes with liberty by imposing legal duties and these duties are not the same for all. . . . [T]he 
institution of ownership constitutes for everyone both a curtailment of some sort of liberty and an 
enlargement of some other sort of liberty.” 
 34. Fried, supra note 31, at 50 (quoting Robert Hale, Economic Nationalism Versus 
Representative Government (unpublished manuscript)). 
 35. Robert L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 451, 452 (1920). 
 36. Robert L. Hale, Our Equivocal Constitutional Guaranties, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 577 (1939). 
 37. Fried, supra note 31, at 50. 
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international-law issues could not be reconciled with a theory of law’s 
essentially territorial character nor with any other general principle delineating 
the scope of sovereign jurisdiction.38 According to Cook, notions of “right” and 
other hypostatizations of legal relations (“party autonomy” included) had no 
more effect in law than as predictions of the probable behavior of certain 
officials in a particular case.39 Cook maintained that judicial behavior in any one 
case was better understood as “a practical result based upon . . . reasons of 
policy.”40 
By Cook’s reading, when, at the behest of a contractual choice of law clause, 
a forum court purported to apply foreign law, that court was disavowing the 
law-creating dimension of its finding that foreign law applied. “The most 
practical and simple statement” of what courts do in such instances, Cook 
contended, “appears to be that the forum always ‘enforces rights’ created by its 
own ‘law’ and never ‘foreign law’ or ‘foreign rights.’”41 Similarly, when a forum 
court determined to uphold an express choice of another jurisdiction set forth in 
a contract, Cook argued, it was not abstaining from lawmaking or permitting an 
evasion of forum law. Rather, the court was making a determination that, 
having regard to public policy in the forum and the reasonableness of the 
parties’ choice in the circumstances, the law of the forum was, for purposes of 
the transaction in question, identical to the rules of the jurisdiction chosen by 
the parties, as the forum court understood them.42 Accordingly, Cook described 
courts’ refusal to give effect to parties’ choice of law, in certain cases, as “purely 
practical,” a decision taken in recognition of risks and inconveniences posed by 
parties litigating in jurisdictions to which their dispute bore little or no 
connection.43 In Cook’s view, “[n]o attempt should be made to state a single, 
comprehensive rule or brief set of rules, to be applied more or less mechanically 
to all types of contracts,” such as a rule or rules requiring deference to parties’ 
expressed or presumed intention in contractual choice of law, subject to certain 
conditions.44 Instead, Cook concluded, “The ‘conflict-of-laws’ problems in the 
field of ‘contracts’ need[ed] to be broken down so that different types of social, 
economic, and business problems may receive separate consideration.”45 
 
 38. COOK 1942, supra note 21, at 3–68. 
 39. Id. at 30–31. Hence Cook’s observations that “th[e] arbitrariness of [parties’] choice is usually 
concealed by confusing the occurrence of the factual events with the attachment of legal obligation” 
and that “an unconscious preference [on the part of the forum court] for the domestic rule of the forum 
may lead to a ‘presumption’ that that ‘law’ is the one the parties ‘intended’ to govern.” Id. at 414, 416. 
 40. Cook 1924, supra note 25, at 480. 
 41. Id. at 478. 
 42. Walter Wheeler Cook, “Contracts” and the Conflict of Laws: “Intention” of the Parties, 32 ILL. 
L. REV. 899 (1937–1938) [hereinafter Cook, Contracts I]. See also Walter Wheeler Cook, “Contracts” 
and the Conflict of Laws: “Intention” of the Parties: Some Further Remarks, 34 ILL. L. REV. 423 (1939–
1940) [hereinafter Cook, Contracts II]. 
 43. Cook, Contracts I, supra note 42, at 920. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. That the generic characterization of “social,” “economic,” or “business” problems could 
itself be subjected to Cook’s critique was not a point taken up in his work. 
JOHNS__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008  7:49:52 AM 
252 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 71:243 
For all the rigor and force of the legal-realist critique, the idea that 
contractual choices of law and forum properly arise from the unfettered will of 
contracting parties (at least in the first instance), and the idea that a principled 
commitment to uphold “party autonomy” yields predictable outcomes across 
private-international-law cases, each retain considerable purchase in private 
international law.46 These ideas prevail, moreover, both as a matter of legal 
doctrine and scholarly analysis. In 2005, for example, the Commission of the 
European Community proposed a regulation to the European Parliament and 
the Council of Europe to clarify and “modernise” the Rome Convention of 
1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Relations, while transforming it into 
an instrument of the European Community. Article 3.1 of the Rome 
Convention already provided that “[a] contract shall be governed by the law 
chosen by the parties.”47 The 2005 proposal sought to “further boost the impact 
of the parties’ will” in relation to choice of law and choice of forum, permitting, 
for example, parties’ selection of codified bodies of nonstate law to govern their 
contractual relations.48 At the same time, scholars in many jurisdictions continue 
to champion the cause of party autonomy. Invoking economic-efficiency 
arguments and political-rights criteria, commentators have rallied periodically 
to contest the perceived winding-back of contractual freedom under mandatory 
rules of private international law or by recourse to governmental-interest 
analysis.49 
There are, of course, a wide variety of ways in which courts across the 
common-law world can and do avoid application of the law and devolution to 
the forum expressly chosen by contracting parties. Courts may find that the 
contract at issue was so formed as to exclude a clause setting forth that choice, 
that the choice was not bona fide, not legally permissible, or was contrary to 
forum public policy, or that the choice of a law or forum unconnected with the 
 
 46. For a study of the status and effects of party autonomy in contractual choice of law in U.S. 
private international law, see Louis C. James, Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on Conflict of 
Laws Contracts, 36 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 34 (1959). 
 47. Convention of the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome Convention), Euro. 
Comm., art. 3.1, June 19, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1492. 
 48. EUR. COMM. DOC. No. 2005/0261 at 5, COM (2005) 650 (15 Dec. 2005). As of August 19, 2007, 
final decisions on the proposal from both the European Parliament and the Council of Europe were 
pending. The Hague Choice of Court Convention seeks to effect a similar change: see Louise Ellen 
Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and Providing an Alternative 
to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543 (2005). 
 49. See, e.g., WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 12, at 67 (“Contractual freedom has been 
substantially wound back by mandatory rules.”); id. at 22 (“Efficiency generally requires that parties 
should be able to agree to the law that should apply to their [contractual] relation, subject to the usual, 
uncontroversial limits on contractual freedom, such as incapacity and duress.”); Lea Brilmayer, Rights, 
Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1275, 1297–98 (1989) (arguing that the application of law 
and the extension of jurisdiction under private-international-law principles must be defensible as a 
matter of political theory and that a subject’s consent to be subjected to a particular rule of law is a 
paradigmatic indicator of the legitimacy of its application); O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 18, at 1277 
(“To the extent practicable, parties should be able to choose their governing law, subject to possible 
procedural protections designed to ensure that the choice is real. In the absence of an explicit 
agreement, courts should apply rules that facilitate party choice or that select the law the parties likely 
would have contracted for—that is, the law of the state with the comparative regulatory advantage.”). 
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contract was otherwise indefensible.50 As noted above, the concern of this article 
is not so much with the question whether arguments framed in terms of party 
autonomy hold sway in private-international-law disputes as a doctrinal matter. 
Rather, its objective is to highlight the background-structuring effects of the 
notion of party autonomy. In other words, regardless of whether parties’ 
explicit choices of law and forum always prevail in litigation or arbitration, that 
a contracting party presumed to be vested with or assertive of autonomy serves 
as a touchstone for scholarly debate and norm development in private 
international law is itself politically significant. It is in light of the persistence of 
this touchstone in recent literature that one may observe that the autonomous 
party has weathered the legal–realist squall remarkably well. 
In public-international-law literature, the sometime conceptual counterpart 
to the contracting party, the autonomous sovereign state, has been subject to 
successive rounds of disaggregation.51 The corporation contracting 
internationally has confronted similar indignities, most notably in the 
decomposition of the enterprise into a “nexus of contracts” in law-and-
economics literature.52 Legal scholarship has also, from time to time, adopted a 
thicker, transaction-specific frame for the analysis of corporate contracting, 
dispensing with contract law’s customary preoccupation with written indicia of 
intent.53 The contributions of this work have been enormous.54 Nonetheless, 
“law-in-action” scholarship on corporate contracting (international and 
domestic) has tended to relocate the search for a stable, impartial principle 
 
 50. See generally NYGH, supra note 8, at 66–71 (discussing, inter alia, Carnival Cruise Lines Inc. v. 
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Oceanic Sun Line 
Special Shipping Co., Inc. v. Fay (1988) 165 C.L.R. 197 (Austl.); Messageries Maritimes v. Wilson 
(1954) 94 C.L.R. 577 (Austl.); Vita Foods, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. (1939) A.C. 277 (Austl.); Golden 
Acres, Ltd. v. Queensland Estates Pty., Ltd (1969) Q.R. 378 (Austl.)). 
 51. See, e.g., David W. Kennedy, A New World Order: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 4 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 329 (1994). 
 52. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 292–93 (2d ed. 1977). See also Steven 
N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1983); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The 
Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. 
L. 819 (1999). For an overview and critique of this literature, see generally Victor Brudney, Corporate 
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985). For further 
efforts to “crack open . . . the black box of the corporation” in relation to contracting behavior, see the 
work of Michael Klausner and Marcel Kahan, supra note 14, at 716. 
 53. Victor Fleischer’s recent contributions are both exemplary of this inclination and indicative of 
the impact of socio-legal critiques of the myopia of “doctrinal” contract-law scholarship. See Fleischer, 
supra note 1; Fleisher, supra note 26. Sociologists have also weighed in on the “debate” between 
“doctrinal” approaches to contract law and more “context-attentive” versions of the discipline. See, e.g., 
Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 91, 96 (2003) (“The key 
finding here is that ‘Contract Law,’ as the doctrinalists study it, exerts remarkably little influence on a 
remarkably wide range of transactions.”); see also Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contingency and Contracts: A 
Philosophy of Complex Business Transactions, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1077, 1077–78 (2005) (“The 
behavior of lawyers and business people in the course of complex commercial transactions and 
relationships suggest homo economicus is not the only model of human behavior, even in economic 
relationships.”). 
 54. For a discussion of some of the implications of socio-legal scholarship for public and private 
international law, see generally Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005). 
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governing legal decision to the domain of context, guiding philosophy, or 
institutional identity. By tracing or attributing corporate legal action to a “nexus 
of contracts,”55 “a bureaucratic hierarchical organization,”56 a tightly woven 
network of “thick personal relationships,”57 or the “culture” of a firm or an 
industry,58 “post-doctrinal” contract, corporate- and private-international-law 
scholarship tends to reproduce, at a different scale and with richer embroidery, 
more or less the very meeting-of-minds-between-autonomous-parties structure 
that it was ostensibly concerned to surpass.59 Instead of offer and acceptance 
between discrete agents, we are presented with a confluence of “corporate 
systems” and the like, each system, organization, community, or culture 
attributed with more or less the coherence and interiority that private 
international law has traditionally attributed to contracting parties (and to 
states).60 As Judith Butler has reminded us, recourse to context in lieu of 
subjectivity often amounts to recourse to yet another “posited unit[y].”61 
The next part of this article works against the tendency to take the 
“interiors” of corporate contracting for granted in assessing decisions 
concerning contractual choice of law and forum. Those decisions by which 
corporations are presumed, by many, to arrive at the most cost-effective or 
transaction-suited choices of law and forum are decisions that emanate from an 
unwieldy normative thicket. The normative dimensions of this thicket are, 
moreover, neither well captured nor best rendered critically negotiable by 
recourse to the “convenience” of party autonomy (whether to celebrate or 
attack it). Envisaging one or more personified corporations to be acting 
 
 55. Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 836. 
 56. Id. at 829 (emphasis omitted). 
 57. Volkmar Gessner, Richard P. Appelbaum & William L.F. Felstiner, Introduction: The Legal 
Culture of Global Business Transactions, in RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF 
GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 1, 2 (Richard P. Appelbaum, William L.F. Felstiner & Volkmar 
Gessner eds., 2001). 
 58. Harry Arthurs, The Role of Global Law Firms in Constructing or Obstructing a Traditional 
Regime of Labour Law, in RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 57, at 273, 273–74. 
 59. For illustrative incarnations of the subjectivity of corporate contracting parties in these various 
modes, see Gessner, Appelbaum & Felstiner, supra note 57, at 2; Eisenberg, supra note 52; M.C. Jensen 
& W.H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310–11 (1976). As Victor Brudney observes, “the vision that informs the 
‘nexus of contracts’ concept approaches the classical mode [of contracting, premised on the 
presumption of autonomy] more closely than it does . . . [an] approach that is sensitive to information 
asymmetries, duress, incapacity, and lack of ‘good faith’ in performance, and that encourages judicial 
intervention to protect those thus disadvantaged.” Brudney, supra note 52, at 1405. 
 60. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 836. Contra Ralf Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State 
Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 
1209, 1247 (2005) (“Once the state no longer serves as the formal criterion distinguishing law from non-
law, no other criterion seems to do the job . . . . [W]e cannot stop arbitrarily at the thin criterion of 
‘community’ . . . .”). 
 61. BUTLER, supra note 19, at xxii. Butler here makes a point that has been much more fully 
elaborated elsewhere, including in anthropological writing on the search for an ethnographic “real” and 
the making of scientific fact. See, e.g., JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE 117–51 
(1988); BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
SCIENTIFIC FACTS (1979). 
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autonomously in choices of law and forum, whether in a straightforward 
transactional mode or in a more complex “nexus of contracts” or similar 
arrangement, tends to mischaracterize the stakes and participants operating in 
this field and the forces at work therein. Accordingly, critical attention should 
be given to some of the decisionmaking dynamics that might otherwise be 
written out of view by that approach. 
III 
DEAL SURREAL: THE OVERDETERMINATION OF AUTONOMOUS CHOICE 
The critique of party autonomy developed here proceeds from a stylized 
account of how corporate lawyers arrive at contractual choices of law and forum 
in transnational corporate deals. This account mobilizes, obliquely, identities 
ranging from the transnational corporation and the corporate lawyer to those of 
“global capital” and “new” lex mercatoria (or transnational merchant law).62 In 
recent literature in private international law, each term has been invested with 
an interiority from which directive force is said to emanate; together, these 
interiors underwrite the insistent autonomy of the private. Yet, contrary to the 
impression generated by standard scholarly renderings of transnational 
corporate agency,63 experiences of corporate transactional work yield no sullied 
corporate “soul” amenable to liberation or circumscription on a disciplinary, 
organizational, or individual level. Whereas Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
have insisted in their widely read book Empire that there is “no more outside” 
to the reign of global capital,64 this article proceeds in the opposite direction, 
toward a claim that there may be no inside to transnational corporate deal-
making that regulates every performance of “autonomous” choice, however 
unassailable certain systemic or subjective “properties” may appear. The 
following sketch of corporate dealing suggests that there may be more 
irresolution to, and a denser array of legal influences upon, private 
decisionmaking than much recent critical scholarship would have us believe.65 
Experiences of transnational corporate dealing register a sense of those legal 
decisions that private international law invests with autonomy as decisions 
“overflowing with the performative.”66 
 
 62. On the conception of the latter as a “body” of law, and its status in private international law, 
see Michaels, supra note 60, at 1218–20. 
 63. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 1, at 1585. 
 64. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 186 (2001). 
 65. See, e.g., A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL 
MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 238 (2003). The transnational corporations 
and the “global mercatocracy” of which they are a part feature in Cutler’s account as “united,” 
directive, and largely autonomous protagonists of contemporary processes of global restructuring. Id. at 
180–82, 237–38. 
 66. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law “The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in ACTS OF RELIGION 
228, 256 (Gil Anidjar ed., 2002). Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A 
Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 518–19 (1986) (attempting to “describe the process of 
legal reasoning as [Kennedy] imagine[s] [he] might do it if [he] were a judge” and thereby “looking at 
law as a person who will have to apply it, interpret it, change it, defy it, or whatever” such that “the 
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This article seeks to evoke an experience of this performative overflow, with 
a view to recapturing a sense of some of the myriad legal and policy issues in 
contention within the architecture of “party autonomy” and the range of people 
who contribute to working out those issues. It is, however, a starting point for 
the account that follows that the redescription of transnational corporate power 
does not render that power up for regulatory grabs, any more than the legal 
preferences expressed by transnational corporations will always prevail. The 
deal is not, in this account, entirely precodified in either direction, even as it is 
patently not a domain of pure freedom. Rather, this article is intended to evoke 
an experience of corporate decisionmaking on contractual choices of law and 
forum in which both the predictability and the pliability of those decisions may 
be experienced anew. 
Importantly, the redescription that follows is not metaphoric. Here, the deal 
is not intended as a stand-in for anything but that which it presents: haphazardly 
recorded notes from days spent as a corporate lawyer. Moreover, this record 
does not purport to erase autonomous personhood in favor of some “improved” 
explanatory points of reference for private international law: a now-routine 
gesture that often serves to enshrine a revised version of the very subjectivity it 
claims to disaggregate or surpass. The discussion that follows here is concerned 
with “how” rather than “what” questions: in particular, how does the necessity 
of transnational corporations prevailing across the global legal order get 
produced through “freely” negotiated transactions? The ensuing account 
implies that the idea of a corporate actor as a coherent, will-bearing subject is 
one medium for that necessity’s production. However, this account will suggest 
that self-consciously contingent identities work rather well in that capacity, 
too.67 
In short, it is not contended here that, in the rabbit warren of a deal, one 
might (or should seek to) outrun coercion and recapture a more “authentic” 
autonomy. Rather, this brief sketch of choice-making in a cross-border deal is 
undertaken towards continued excavation (and, potentially, critical 
mobilization) of the innumerable background “rules” by which legal choosers 
and choices are shaped, circumscribed, and empowered. As indicated earlier, 
the work of legal–realist scholars such as Robert Hale and Walter Wheeler 
Cook taught us much about how the apparent inevitabilities of corporate 
domination are produced, day by day, decision by decision, deal by deal.68 It is 
in debt to Hale’s and Cook’s studies of the regulatory power borne by 
“unofficial minorities,” the ubiquity of coercion, and the endowments of 
 
experience of legality may well be different according to the character of the ‘I want’ that opposes ‘the 
law’”). 
 67. Contra Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959 
(1992). 
 68. Annelise Riles argues (persuasively) that “[t]he innovation of Cook and his cohort . . . lay in 
elevating the instrument, the relationship of means to ends, as an object of explicit contemplation, of 
ethnographic analysis.” Annelise Riles, The Technocratic State: Means and Ends 26 (Sept. 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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intangible privilege as well as tangible property, that the daily life of a deal is 
sketched here. 
A. Doing Deals: The Vocabulary of the Market 
When corporate lawyers engaged in the “American mode of production of 
law” 69 talk to each other about international transactional work in which they 
are engaged, they use the nomenclature of the deal. “We just won a mining deal 
in Chile.” “I know [X] from that deal we did last year.” “I can’t do [Y] until this 
deal closes.” Among legal elites dedicated to transactional work in the 
international financial sector, these are the terms in which lives are punctuated. 
Whereas scholarship concerning transnational corporate contracting has tended 
to prefer the vocabulary of agreements, regulations, firms, and institutions (with 
important exceptions),70 industry rags announce “deals of the year.” Under the 
banner of a deal, industry publications summarize an assemblage of legal and 
nonlegal arrangements among participants public and private.71 
Documenting all of the arrangements among the parties involved in a deal, 
and their authority to enter into those arrangements, is the responsibility of 
lawyers. For the lawyers concerned, “getting the deal done” will mean, at a 
minimum, getting those documents prepared, negotiated, and signed, so that 
money (debt and equity) may start to move. Included in that task will be the 
satisfaction of a litany of legal and nonlegal conditions precedent to financing. 
The issues to be negotiated to that end are numerous and often fraught. In the 
project-finance context, for example, they typically revolve around the 
entitlement of foreign lenders to oversee a project’s day-to-day financial and 
technical management and, should problems arise, to step in and take over. This 
is the sort of scene being evoked here: a complex transaction, presenting an 
array of multijurisdictional, multidisciplinary issues for negotiation, in which 
sizeable amounts of money and the provision of basic services (via energy 
infrastructure, for example) are at issue. 
B. Performing (Corporate) Power: Pace, Place, and Projected Returns 
Each occasion of a deal’s performance is, in some sense, an abyss. 
Nevertheless, some stylistic markers recur, among them what might be thought 
of as mechanistic or menial elements of a deal: questions of scheduling and 
venue often left to junior or nonprofessional staff. To locate at this level 
arrangements coloring the making of “substantive” legal decisions, including 
choices of law and forum, is to stress that power is ubiquitous across the deal’s 
 
 69. David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of 
Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407, 413 n.5, 419–26 
(1994). 
 70. See, e.g., Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: 
International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 215 (1996); Jeswald W. Salacuse, 
Renegotiating International Business Transactions: The Continuing Struggle of Life Against Form, 35 
INT’L LAW. 1507 (2001). But see Lipshaw, supra note 53, at 1077–78; Suchman, supra note 53, at 96. 
 71. See, e.g., Latin American Power Deal of the Year 2007, PROJECT FIN. MAG., Feb. 2008, at 1. 
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formulation as such (a point made, in relation to economic relations generally, 
by Robert Hale).72 
Typically, the first step in embarking upon a complex cross-border deal is 
for the sponsors’ (or equity investors’) legal or financial advisors to convene an 
“all hands” meeting. So begin the successive rounds of meetings and conference 
calls that comprise the daily life of the deal. These are oriented around a draft 
document, pending-issue list, or logistical concerns. They are interspersed with 
periods of feverish document preparation on the part of lawyers and occasional 
lulls in activity. The tempo of the deal tends toward this faltering rhythm. Time 
drags in the long, air-conditioned hours of a multi-party meeting. Then, 
periodically, it gets compressed and caffeinated—pushed against the railing of a 
deadline. Each time that a lawyer gets called upon to make a decision, however 
significant, its making will be inflected in some way by this discontinuous 
temporality.73 Engineering the reduction of transaction costs is supposedly the 
lawyers’ broader mandate, a mandate discharged, in part, by identifying a 
choice of law and jurisdiction considered “optimal” for the parties, in terms of 
the economic and other advantages that may flow therefrom.74 This is how, it 
has been claimed, lawyers “create value.”75 Yet neither identification of the 
“costs” of each available choice, nor the “value-creating” processes of their 
comparison and elimination, is independent of the cadence of their 
performance.76 
Another action typically taken early in corporate deal-making is the 
gathering of precedents.77 Having reviewed publicly available documents and 
firm files (containing documents from prior deals in which they participated), 
each of the major law firms involved in a deal will assemble disclosure 
documents, contracts, and legal opinions pertaining to comparable deals. These 
may be selected for their industry relationship to the current deal, geographic 
proximity, or structural similarities. Any prior agreements to which current deal 
participants have been a party in somewhat similar circumstances will also be 
gathered for the evidence that they provide about terms previously accepted by 
 
 72. Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 626 
(1943). 
 73. This temporality is too erratic and deal-specific to be amenable to modelling in terms of time-
inconsistent preferences. But see Manuel A. Utset, A Model of Time-Inconsistent Misconduct: The Case 
of Lawyer Misconduct, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 (2005). 
 74. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 246 (1993) 
(“[Choice-of-law] clauses provide standard terms and are a powerful way of avoiding inefficient 
mandatory rules . . . . [thereby] minimizing transaction costs.”). 
 75. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 
YALE L.J. 239 (1984); Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering (Duke L. 
Sch. Legal Stud., Paper No. 108, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=901439. 
 76. “[T]empo,” wrote Nietzsche, “is as significant a power in the development of peoples as in 
music.” FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE: WITH A PRELUDE IN GERMAN RHYMES AND AN 
APPENDIX OF SONGS 36 (Josefine Nauckhoff trans., 2001). 
 77. Kahan and Klausner outline, in terms of “learning benefits” and “network benefits,” some of 
the factors influencing lawyers’ use of precedents. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 14, at 719–29. 
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those parties, and hence the range of negotiating possibilities potentially 
available. 
In addition, drafting responsibilities will be allocated, at an early stage, 
among the lawyers involved in the deal. This allocation may be made, in part, 
on the basis of the deal experience (and, by extension, the depth and range of 
precedents) that one or another law firm can boast. It will also depend upon the 
style of lawyering favored by the persons in question. Some lawyers insist, 
wherever possible, on controlling the document (and hence, to some degree, the 
negotiating agenda) in their clients’ interests.78 Others prefer to weigh in on the 
drafting process in a commentator role. 
Among the terms commonly subject to standardization in corporate practice 
(terms conveyed from contract to contract with minimal alteration, often 
referred to as boilerplate provisions)79 are the choice-of-law and choice-of-
forum provisions. Accordingly, the starting point for the negotiation of 
applicable law and jurisdiction for a contract will often depend upon which law 
firm has assumed responsibility for drafting that contract and hence the 
institutional origin of the guiding precedent for that exercise. Thereafter, the 
ease with which nondrafting deal participants accept the drafting firm’s 
boilerplate may depend on a range of factors, from the volume of 
documentation those concerned are called upon to review (and the time 
afforded to do so), to the confidence that participant–makers have come to 
place in the lawyers responsible for the drafting task in question. The fact that 
choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses, along with other boilerplate 
provisions, typically appear at the back of a contract also ensures that they 
often receive less critical attention than they otherwise might.80 Thus, 
notwithstanding the emphasis often placed, retrospectively, on the positive 
“truth” of each party’s consent to a clause stipulating a choice of law or 
jurisdiction,81 the actual enactment of choice in relation to these terms is 
frequently, to some degree, a matter of compound inertia. Those negotiating a 
contract may be unwilling to query that which presents as routine (or accepted 
market practice) in a competent draft. Implicit reliance might also be placed on 
 
 78. On the disproportionate power that may be enjoyed by the “party with the pen,” see Lawrence 
M. Solan, The Written Contract as Safe Harbor for Dishonest Conduct, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 92 
(2001). 
 79. For the meaning of “boilerplate” in this context, see supra note 10. 
 80. Tina Stark has observed that “[d]eal lawyers most frequently come into contact with 
boilerplate provisions at 2:00 A.M., after the business portions of the contract have been hammered out 
or reviewed—hardly a propitious time to begin extensive, critical analysis.” TINA L. STARK, 
NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING CONTRACT BOILERPLATE § 1.02 (2003). 
 81. See, e.g., I.P. Metal Ltd. v. Ruote Oz SpA, 1994 WL 1060817 (Cal. Civ. Div.), [1994] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 560 (considering, as a question of fact, “whether or not the parties concerned truly consented or 
agreed to a special jurisdiction clause to govern any disputes between them”) (emphasis added). But see 
Lake Avery, 1996 WL 1093659 (QBD (Adm. Ct.)), [1997] C.L.C. 683, [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 540 
(requiring only a “good arguable case” that the parties agreed to a contract governed by U.K. law). 
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the received “wisdom” of well-credentialed, experienced lawyers—wisdom 
presumed to be embedded in a given firm’s chosen precedents.82 
Where contract negotiation meetings occur is also a matter bearing, 
potentially, on the substance of parties’ contractual choice of applicable law and 
forum. Typically, “high level” strategic meetings will be convened in the 
principal financing venue, where the preponderance of a deal’s international 
personnel are likely based. More mechanical, project-specific matters, such as 
regulatory filings, due diligence, and the negotiation of operational and 
technical agreements, will usually be dealt with locally, in the country of 
investment. These latter meetings will often involve junior lawyers, who are 
frequently those with the strongest language skills within international firms. 
Through the navigation and staffing of deal-making locales, the deal is given a 
significant scalar dimension. Through the type of meetings convened in each 
locale, the country of investment is typically cast as the particularized ground to 
or from which deracinated “internationals” seek both a knowing proximity (in 
the sense of “having one’s ear close to the ground”) and the safety of distance 
(so as to be able to project a generalized business sense, attuned to the “needs” 
of the global market).83 
This scalar dimension, in turn, feeds into the range of legal possibility 
experienced within the deal, including in relation to choices of law and forum. 
Consider, for instance, the choice of arbitration venue for disputes arising under 
a material contract for an emerging-market project financing.84 International 
counsel would commonly advise that the market norm is to convene such 
arbitration in a major international capital home to none of the potential 
disputants, in which some or all parties are presumed capable of feeling at 
home, while being insulated from unseemly, parochial influences.85 In the 
interests of national pride, or for other practical or strategic reasons, local 
sponsors and their counsel might argue for arbitration to be seated at a local or 
regional center for international commercial arbitration.86 The former argument 
most frequently prevails, in part because of the interests of all persons 
concerned in presenting as being fluent in the dispassionate language of global 
 
 82. Kahan and Klausner have observed that “[a]necdotal evidence suggests that [the] copying [of 
precedent documents] is sometimes based on the drafter’s faith that prior users have eliminated 
formulation errors, rather than on [an] independent understanding and assessment of [each] standard 
term.” Kahan & Klausner, supra note 14, at 721 n.16. 
 83. See Annelise Riles, The View From the International Plane: Perspective and Scale in the 
Architecture of Colonial International Law, 6 LAW & CRITIQUE 39 (1995). 
 84. See Filip De Ly, The Place of Arbitration in the Conflict of Laws of International Commercial 
Arbitration: An Exercise in Arbitration Planning, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 48 (1991). 
 85. See, e.g., Stefano E. Cirielli, Arbitration, Financial Markets, and Banking Disputes, 14 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 243, 249 (2003). 
 86. On the establishment of centers for international commercial arbitration in Asia, Africa, and 
the Islamic world in the late 1970s, see Charles N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe, International 
Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 643, 653–54 (2003). 
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commerce.87 However, where a local party has been able to secure the 
attendance of senior “internationals” at meetings in the project’s home country 
(housed in the protective bubble of a suitably generic corporate office), it might 
seem more plausible to the lenders to accept, say, International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) arbitration in the project region, in the event of dispute under 
one of the deal’s key agreements.88 Aside from the implications of this 
arrangement for any resulting dispute, such a concession tends to take deal 
negotiation in a rather different direction. Struggles over schedule and venue 
function as struggles over authority within and over the deal and, obliquely, 
over its material outcomes. Of such quotidian, routine stuff are “autonomous 
choices” made and remade. 
At this discontinuous tempo and at these various sites, participant–makers 
perform “choice,” in part, as an enactment of deal-specific identities. These 
identities, among lawyers, invariably shift: now one is speaking or writing as 
representative of another (“my client has instructed me to . . . ”); now as a 
principal (drafting an opinion of one’s firm, for instance); now as employee or 
employer (when, for instance, lawyers within a firm speak to one another about 
the deal, partner-to-associate). Here one speaks as the most senior lawyer in the 
room; there one is the most junior lawyer; at another time, one talks as a lawyer 
to a nonlawyer (imparting advice to a nonlawyer client, instructing an 
administrative staff person, or receiving information from an expert in another 
field). Learning by observation and imitation, lawyers acquire facility in these 
various roles. The lawyer role that one is performing at any given moment sets a 
bearing for the legal decisions at which one arrives. 
Other identities are also enacted that may wreak havoc with assigned roles 
and formal hierarchies. On a certain deal, a particular lawyer might be the quiet 
one, the belligerent one, the old hand, the young gun, the work-horse, or the 
“rain-maker” (that is, the one whose particular gift appears to be bringing 
profitable new deals through the door). A lawyer may also circulate through 
these roles over the life of the deal. He who performed as sexy and charismatic 
at the first meeting may present as lumpish and withdrawn at another. She who 
seemed compliant on one occasion might later become the recalcitrant one. 
How one does a deal, in a particular instance, will be informed by an implicit 
loyalty to the role that one assumes within the sociopolitical life of the deal. If I 
am the young one on this deal, I may defer to my older counterparty on a 
particular negotiating point, or I may fight it to the death. If I am the funny one, 
I may be ill-inclined to rock one or another negotiating boat, for fear of losing 
my likeability. Conventionally, atomism and anomie are supposed to result 
 
 87. Judge Keba Mbaye (then of the International Court of Justice) observed that developing 
countries are rarely the venue of international arbitration. See Fali S. Nariman, Courts and Arbitrators: 
Paradigms of Arbitral Autonomy, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 185, 189–90 (1997). 
 88. The Arbitration Rules of the ICC provide that the place of arbitration shall be chosen by the 
parties or, in the absence of parties’ choice, fixed by the Paris-based Court of the ICC. Rules of the 
Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce art. 14 (1998). 
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from sustained engagement in the work of capital.89 At close range, however, 
one finds that it is often through the cultivation and repetitive performance of 
“personal” idiosyncrasies—and the momentum and loyalties generated 
thereby—that choices are made and deals shaped.90 
Particular idiosyncrasies tend to recur, albeit in modes varying significantly 
among corporate professionals. Ready-made scripts are received and sent on, 
and these are often framed in terms of economic or strategic goals. Those in the 
role of investors typically understand themselves to be seeking a return on their 
respective investments: lenders, through the payment of interest; equity 
investors, through the sale of goods or services at a profit, after debt repayment. 
The parties concerned may also have other objectives in engaging in a deal. 
One investor might be seeking particular tax or accounting treatment for an 
investment, to improve its balance sheet. Another might be pursuing vertical 
integration by, for example, extending a portfolio of downstream energy 
investments upstream. Among lenders, a project might complement an existing 
investment portfolio (spreading risk in terms of industry or geography), or it 
may be responsive to client demand for access to certain types of investment 
opportunity. In relation to choices of law and jurisdiction, as well as other 
matters, legal counsel will understand themselves to be charged with ensuring 
that these various goals are met or with reconciling them to the extent of 
conflict. Yet these roles too have an inherent volatility. One cannot be sure 
whether one’s goal-oriented performance will arrive at its destination. 
Yesterday’s visionary is often today’s cowboy.91 Moreover, the promise of 
projected returns depends in part upon an embrace of the risk that those 
returns might not come about. 
In pursuing this or that goal, deal participants tend to understand 
themselves to be assuming a particular posture towards, or maintaining a 
certain relationship to, risk. This often folds into the performance of a 
particular corporate identity. Fleischer maintains that “[c]ontract design helps 
form the identity of the firm.”92 One firm may be more “aggressive” or “push 
the envelope” more than another. Whatever the institutional identity they are 
performing, lawyers engaged in cross-border transactional investment typically 
envisage themselves engaged in site-specific navigation of a matrix of risks.93 
 
 89. The classic account is HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964). This thesis is 
attributable in more general terms to EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY 
(Routledge 2d ed., 2002) (1897). 
 90. Consider, for example, the vivid portraits coloring the deal memories of a U.S. corporate 
lawyer, in LAWRENCE LEDERMAN, TOMBSTONES: A LAWYER’S TALES FROM THE TAKEOVER 
DECADES 77, 189 (1992). 
 91. The contrast between pre-bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy portrayals of Enron’s top 
management is illustrative. See Craig S. Lerner, Calling a Truce in the Culture Wars: From Enron to the 
CIA, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 277, 291–92 (2006). 
 92. Fleischer, supra note 1, at 1588. 
 93. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 26, at 478; John Flood, Doing Business: The Management of 
Uncertainty in Lawyers’ Work, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 41 (1991); Arturo O. Vega, Risk Allocation in 
Infrastructure Financing, 3 J. PROJECT FIN. 38 (1997). 
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“Risk allocation” is engineered in the detail of deal agreements, including in 
choices of law and forum for deal-related contracts. Commonly, in relation to 
jurisdictional choice, foreign investors’ lawyers favor selection of their “home” 
forum and corresponding law, understanding that selection to be a mitigant of 
the risk that their clients’ contractual rights might prove unenforceable in the 
event of default. An argument will often be made that the home jurisdiction (or 
another investor-favored jurisdiction) is more accustomed to handling disputes 
arising under contracts of the type in question and, by reason of the 
accumulation of judicial precedent in comparable matters, is more likely to 
arrive at carefully considered and relatively predictable decisions for the benefit 
of all parties. Alternatively, foreign investors might wish to secure the support 
of a host government for a particular deal in order to mitigate the risk of asset 
nationalization or expropriation. In pursuit of this second risk-mitigation 
objective, those investors might elect to make a concession on contractual 
forum selection—acceding to choice of the host government’s preferred forum 
in relation to certain contracts—as a sign of respect, trust, and positive 
engagement. In so doing, the lawyers concerned would likely understand their 
clients to be taking a calculated risk, balancing one risk (unenforceability of 
foreign investors’ contractual rights in a particular jurisdiction) against another 
(nationalization or expropriation). Lawyers representing a host state will be 
expected to make a similar calibration of risk from the other side of this 
imagined equation. 
Yet, for all the labors of risk calibration across a deal, this analysis is 
continually perceived as incomplete.94 Risk proliferates. Risk cannot be 
contained. One discerns, among corporate transactional lawyers, at once an 
anxiety about risk and a belief in its centrality to legal work.95 Among these 
lawyers, contingency is often perceived as a life-giving and bountiful force.96 
With risk comes the promise of return for the client and the invigorating sense 
that one is acting beyond the realm of precedent.97 
It is perhaps this sense of proximity to risk that evokes such efforts of 
choreography among transactional lawyers. It is a dedication to the 
choreographic endeavor that one discerns, above all, in the daily work of 
 
 94. See, e.g., Robert E. Ebel, Politics Before Business: A Study in Risk Analysis by a Multinational 
Corporation, 11 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 453, 454 (1989) (“Country risk analysis is strictly subjective, and 
there is no alternative.”); Michael P. Malloy, International Project Finance: Risk Analysis and 
Regulatory Concerns, 18 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 89, 105 (2004) (“The current regulatory rules for the 
supervision of risk are not sophisticated enough to reflect the actual degree of risk in a particular 
transaction accurately . . . .”). 
 95. See Roy Kreitner, Speculations on Contract, or How Contract Law Stopped Worrying and 
Learned to Love Risk, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1132–33 (2000); Lipshaw, supra note 53, at 1082–
1100. 
 96. Lipshaw observes that “dealmakers live with contingency, but they do not necessarily invoke 
the law to control it.” Lipshaw, supra note 53, at 1092. 
 97. See, e.g., JAMES C. FREUND, LAWYERING: A REALISTIC APPROACH TO LEGAL PRACTICE 3 
(1979) (“For want of a better term, I consider myself an activist lawyer—I believe that . . . the 
practitioner must at all times be alert, reach out and accomplish.”). 
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transactional lawyering: a persistent effort to ensure everyone involved in the 
deal a designated role and to have them perform it more or less to script. This 
commitment to orchestration extends well beyond the production of legal 
documents. Transactional lawyers tend to agonize as much over menus as they 
do over covenants. Logistical planning, project management, and hospitality 
may occupy lawyers’ time almost as much as technical legal work. Whereas 
private international law scholarship on contractual choice of law tends to cast 
transnational corporate power as supreme,98 those engaged in the doing of a 
deal often seem scrupulously attentive to its fragility. 
This hazard-riddled deal landscape is terraced, in part, in terms of “what the 
law requires” in the various jurisdictions concerned. Lawyers delineate the 
range of permissible action under relevant national and international laws and 
tinker with the deal accordingly. If a state-owned company is involved in the 
deal, lawyers will focus on the range of choices in which that entity is permitted 
to engage, under applicable national laws (including private international law) 
and prior contractual commitments. Having regard to the treaty commitments 
of the relevant states, and the past practice of their courts in private-
international-law disputes, lawyers assess prospects for contract-enforcement 
and foreign-judgment recognition in this or that jurisdiction. And so on and so 
forth, the legal analyses continue. The implication of any such analysis is that 
capital must bend to the “will” of the law or of legal institutions. 
The deal is also demarcated, from time to time, in terms of “what the 
market requires.” It may be understood, for example, that the market 
“requires” that withholding or other tax not attach to debt repayments to 
foreign lenders or to dividends paid to foreign equity holders. Counsel would 
then dedicate themselves to devising a funds-flow- and contractual structure to 
achieve that result, one dimension of which may be an attempt to “relocate” the 
transaction wholly offshore, excising it from the taxing jurisdiction. In such a 
scenario, the selection of the law or submission to the jurisdiction of the taxing 
state may be ruled out at the behest of “the market.” Each legal issue open for 
negotiation within a deal will be discussed (at least in part) in terms of market 
norms. The implication of any such discussion is that the law must bend to the 
“will” of capital and its drive to accumulate. 
Yet the promise of capital accumulation is, as already noted, one only ever 
expressed in forecast terms. Likewise, the assurance of lawfulness will become 
increasingly tentative the more that a deal is seen as breaking new ground (an 
alluring prospect for participant–makers vested in affirming their own 
creativity). Among the risks with which participant–makers will understand 
themselves to be intimate is the risk that their deal-specific approximation of 
 
 98. See, e.g., Ama S. Bekoe, Comment, The Illusory Choice: Examining the Illusion of “Choice” in 
Choice of Law Provisions—A Country Study Exploring One Aspect of Foreign Investment in the 
Caribbean, 42 HOW. L.J. 505, 511 (1999) (“[I]n the context of foreign investment into developing 
countries, weaker parties are consistently stripped of the ability to choose the law that will govern their 
contracts in any meaningful way.”). 
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either “what the law requires” or “what the market requires” might be 
controverted from somewhere beyond the deal. It might turn out that the 
lawyers’ reading of pertinent private-international-law authorities does not 
conform to an appellate court’s subsequent pronouncement on the same. The 
market’s appetite for the product being produced by the borrower might wane. 
Thus, the deal hovers between deal-specific projections of two horizons—“what 
the law requires” and “what the market requires”—each one often as unsettled 
as the other. 
C. The Model as Mute Master: Deal as Commodity 
If the undecidedness of a complex, cross-border deal acquires an objective 
existence for its participant–makers, it is more or less encapsulated by the 
financial model that in-house and external financial advisors usually produce in 
the course of its planning. Literally, the model is a set of interlocking 
spreadsheets in which economic relationships are established between 
simulated variables in an attempt to calibrate the economic consequences of 
particular future scenarios.99 The model represents an attempt to cultivate a 
master narrative of uncertainty for the deal: both to entrain risk and to give the 
deal over to risk. Lawyers rarely engage with the details of the financial model, 
but nonetheless tend to regard it, if only obliquely, as an expression of the 
deal’s central animus and purpose. Its very impenetrability (for all but the few 
financial types who work on it) seems to augment the model’s talismanic 
force.100 
The model also expresses another sense in which the deal tends to be 
experienced by participant–makers: as a work of art or industry operating 
independently of any would-be authors.101 In the automated unity of the model, 
one gains an impression of the deal as the work of many, yet belonging to no 
one. Transactional lawyers tend, accordingly, to experience the deal as a 
collaborative, creative work, at one remove from the grubby brawls in which 
their litigation colleagues engage.102 This sense of the deal often exerts a 
pacifying effect on employer–employee relations, as well as on disputes that 
might otherwise arise over forum selection and choice of law. The law-firm 
associate handed yet another urgent, late-night assignment tends to understand 
 
 99. The Monte Carlo class of computation algorithms is often used for this purpose, the name of 
which signals their incorporation of randomness and repetition. See Sawakis Savvides, Risk Analysis in 
Investment Appraisal, 9 PROJECT APPRAISAL J. 3 (1994). 
 100. Miyazaki and Riles rightly warn against overemphasizing the mystique of this financial artifact, 
which is more often than not treated with disinterest (beyond certain fundamental features and 
outputs) except by its designated keepers. Hirokazu Miyazaki & Annelise Riles, Failure as an 
Endpoint, in GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND ETHICS AS ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
PROBLEMS 320, 320–21 (Aihwa Ong & Stephen J. Collier eds., 2005) (presenting an “ethnographic 
inquiry into market participants’ apprehensions of the failure of economic knowledge . . . as an 
endpoint” that seeks to give attention to “the mundane quality of the mundane”). 
 101. Fleischer casts deal structure as a product or advertising medium, the effects of which remain 
“ethereal.” Fleischer, supra note 1, at 1586. 
 102. See, e.g., Freund, supra note 97, at 35. 
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the deal to be doing this to her, not the partner communicating the demand. 
Similarly, particular choices of law and forum may be framed as dictates of the 
deal. The choice of a jurisdiction perceived to be particularly “investor friendly” 
may be experienced as a consequence, not of subjective preference, but rather 
of the compulsion to render a deal “saleable” as an economic and risk package 
(of which the model is the highest expression). Through the deal’s circulation as 
collective work, friction is assuaged, available choices eliminated, and points of 
possible resistance smoothed away. 
After closing, the autonomy with which the deal is invested subsists in the 
commodified mode of a precedent. A particular deal structure gets invested 
with a brand value independent of the institutional or jurisdictional sites of its 
making.103 As noted above, lawyers embarking on a new deal will often begin by 
collecting publicly available accounts of past deals bearing some connection to 
their yet-to-be-created work, from which a new deal is assembled like some 
Dadaist collage. In so doing, they insert their new deal into a deal-lineage 
associated with “success”; associative value is purloined, reputation bolstered, 
and anxiety about uncertainty of outcome further allayed. 
Hence, the deal-commodity’s circulation fosters reproduction of the very 
“stylized repetition of acts” or “knowledge practices” by which deal-specific 
“choices” were produced.104 The deal evokes a collective allegiance among 
participant–makers that sets it apart from relations among them, however 
fraught. Accordingly, the instability arising from the deal’s “performativity” 
gets cast outwards (as market uncertainty or as a variable response to 
generalized systemic demands) rather than inwards (as, say, employer–
employee or investor–state conflict). The standard scholarly rejoinder has been 
to redouble that movement away from the deal’s performative terrain: to plumb 
the global market’s “interior,” ascribing determinative force to a latent bias or 
culture within this entity or that. The foregoing account suggests the potential 
fruitfulness of a different engagement—moving through the substance of the 
market, the law, the corporation, or Empire,105 and into the melee of 
performances that are their properties, powers, and choices. 
IV 
REVISITING “AUTONOMY” IN THE CHOICE OF NONSTATE NORMS 
What questions arise from the foregoing redescription of the exercise of 
“choice” in international contracting that may be salient for current debates in 
private international law? In response to that question, this part begins by 
considering the controversy ongoing in private-international-law scholarship 
 
 103. See generally Fleischer, supra note 1, at 1582, 1628; D. Gordon Smith, The “Branding Effect” of 
Contracts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189 (2007). 
 104. BUTLER, supra note 19, at 191. See also Riles, supra note 7, at 1030. 
 105. See generally HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 64. 
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concerning the selection of nonstate law (contemporary incarnations of the so-
called lex mercatoria) as the governing law in commercial contracts.106 
Legal scholars’ and practitioners’ endorsement of lex mercatoria amounts, in 
one account, to “a new political movement, aimed at replacing the national 
regulation of foreign trade with a transnational, customary law.” 107 “Partisans of 
[the] ‘new’ lex mercatoria,” according to Stephen Sachs, “look forward to a day 
when arbitrators will be free to decide cases according to the custom of 
merchants, relaxing a national regulation when it is ‘not fit for international 
trade.’”108 Supporters of this “movement” justify recourse to lex mercatoria by 
reason of its responsiveness to contemporary socioeconomic demands, 
particularly the “need” for law to be commercially effective. Thus, Jean-Pierre 
Dupuy has written,  
[Forms of international trade] have created a phenomenon whose principal 
characteristic is that it is spontaneous and has been established by the creation of new 
rules or by the adaptation of existing legal rules and practice to the requirements of 
contemporary international economy. Its origin is the need for effectiveness pursued 
by the various economic agents across, or in defiance of, frontiers.109  
Some commentators also stress that allowing parties’ recourse to lex 
mercatoria is consistent with private international law’s declared respect for 
party autonomy and consonant with private international law’s pursuit of 
certainty and predictability.110 In the surrounding debate, partisans and 
 
 106. For scholarship supportive of affording parties the option of subjecting commercial contracts to 
lex mercatoria, see, for example, Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Remaking of Arbitration: Design and 
Destiny, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 23 
(Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., rev. ed. 1998) (hereinafter LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION); 
Andreas Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator’s View, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, 
supra, at 71; Friedrich K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the New Law Merchant, 28 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 487 (1995); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private 
International Law, 60 LA. L. REV. 1133 (2000). For reservations about this prospect, see, for example, 
OKEZIE CHUKWUMERIJE, CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 130 
(1994) (observing that national courts’ deference to the customary norms of the “new” law merchant 
would “grant arbitrators the power to dictate which rules of national laws would be applied in the 
national arena, a rather strange prospect”); William W. Park, Control Mechanisms in the Development 
of a Modern Lex Mercatoria, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra, at 143 (querying 
whether lex mercatoria might be “a fig leaf to hide an unauthorized substitution of [arbitrators’] private 
normative preferences in place of the parties’ shared expectations under the properly applicable law”); 
Symeon C. Symeonides, Contracts Subject to Non-State Norms, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 209, 224–27 (Supp. 
2006) (expressing concern that nonstate norms’ selection might authorize the exploitation of relatively 
unsophisticated or weak parties and worry as to the uncertain, imprecise content of the lex mercatoria). 
See generally Michael Joachim Bonell, Soft Law and Party Autonomy: The Case of the UNIDROIT 
Principles, 51 LOY. L. REV. 229 (2005); J.H. Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The 
Operation of the International Commercial and Financial Legal Order and Its Lex Mercatoria, 24 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 129 (2006); Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International 
Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 657 (1999). 
 107. Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval “Law 
Merchant,” 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685, 808 (2006) (noting also that use of a supposed medieval 
notion of the “law merchant” as a model for corporate self-regulation has attracted some criticism). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Legal Opinion to Aminoil para. 26, in Aminoil Pleadings, Kuwait v. 
Aminoil (1982) 21 I.L.M. 976, quoted in Maniruzzaman, supra note 106, at 667. 
 110. Lowenfeld, supra note 106, at 71, 75–76 (quoting, with approval, Professor Ole Lando’s 
observation that “[b]y choosing the lex mercatoria the parties oust the technicalities of national legal 
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recalcitrants alike assume that the trade-off to be made, through the medium of 
lex mercatoria, is one between state power and private lawmaking power, or 
between traditional “statist” and supposedly more innovative “pluralist” 
approaches to private international law.111 
To some extent, the foregoing restaging of the choice of law could be read 
as raising similar questions to those articulated in the lex mercatoria debate. 
Concern about the collapse of law into raw power, and the abuse of power, is a 
recurring theme of the latter debate. Stephen Toope maintains, for instance, 
that “the so-called lex mercatoria is largely an effort to legitimize as ‘law’ the 
economic interests of Western corporations.”112 Ralf Michaels highlights that 
this worry is not assuaged by the prospect of states embracing nonstate 
lawmaking under a “cosmopolitan” private international law: “The apotheosis 
of legal pluralism collapses back into crude international relations realism in 
which each community determines what is best for itself.”113 Further, states’ 
legal recognition of nonstate law “becomes the opposite of recognition—it 
becomes a ‘violent appropriation.’”114 Perhaps sensitivity to the concentration of 
power in private hands (with or without state “recognition” thereof) should be 
felt all the more acutely when one takes account of the myriad, barely 
perceptible ways that power, vested unevenly through and within corporate 
deal-making, already operates to shape “choice.” 
The point of the foregoing discussion, however, has not been to defend law 
against private coercion. Rather, the concern of this narrative has been to 
suggest the difficulty—even the impossibility—of pitting law against (economic 
or political) power, or of pitting freely (privately) chosen outcomes against 
legislatively (publicly) mandated outcomes, in relation to contractual choices of 
law and forum. That difficulty arises from the mutually constitutive nature or 
the inseparability of law and power, private choice, and public interest, as 
played out in the tangled web of a deal. In this sense, the analysis here 
sideswipes and disrupts, rather than replicates, the structure of the lex 
mercatoria debate (to the extent that it can be attributed with a structure). The 
line of questioning that part III is intended to provoke can perhaps best be 
illustrated by reverting to one of the questions posed at the outset of this article: 
What gets ruled in and ruled out when one locates choice-of-law-related 
questions after the deal? 
 
systems and they avoid rules which are unfit for international contract”; noting, further, that “the 
general principles of the law merchant offer at least as much predictability as the (often unexpected) 
law of a given country, particularly a law not selected by the parties”; and attributing the binding force 
of lex mercatoria to its recognition “‘as an autonomous norm system by the business community.’” 
(quoting Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 747 at 748, 752 (1985))). 
 111. See, e.g., Dalhuisen, supra note 106, at 133–34. For a more nuanced account of “statist” and 
“pluralist” positions and their interaction, see Michaels, supra note 60. 
 112. STEPHEN J. TOOPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: STUDIES IN ARBITRATION 
BETWEEN STATES AND PRIVATE PERSONS 96 (1990). 
 113. Michaels, supra note 60, at 1255, 1258 (footnote omitted). 
 114. Id. 
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One possibility apparently ruled out of the lex mercatoria debate is the 
prospect that the stakes at issue in this debate (or at least some incarnations 
thereof) are rather inconsequential. By focusing attention on the contractual 
designation of lex mercatoria and its (affirmative or negative) public-policy 
implications, private international lawyers may be buying into the very “statist” 
fictions many rail so hard against. That is, to worry about whether national laws 
expressly permit corporations to subject their dealings to lex mercatoria is to 
reaffirm that the private power about which one must be most circumspect is 
that which explicitly co-opts “public” functions, such as lawmaking. 
Assumptions that may be embedded in this worry include the following: that 
public (state) power and private (corporate) power routinely offset (rather than 
support) each other, that they ordinarily occupy distinct spheres of influence, 
and that coercive power corresponding to private parties gets ramped up to a 
noteworthy or question-begging degree only when it visibly enters a domain 
properly reserved to the state. In their reliance on something approaching these 
assumptions, both sides of the lex mercatoria debate may be read to occupy 
more or less the same ground, so that this controversy might begin to sound 
rather like quibbling between compatriots. 
The lex mercatoria “debate” might thus be foreclosed in favor of a partial 
understanding of law–power relations before it even gets underway. If, 
however, one regards these shared understandings as politically or empirically 
indefensible, then the pragmatic question for private international law becomes 
not whether private lawmaking (as opposed to public lawmaking), but how and 
with what effects power gets produced and allocated in and through legal 
decisionmaking in particular instances, and how and with what effects might it 
be allocated differently.115 The latter are by no means new questions, but they 
are ones that rarely seem to get asked when private-international-law scholars 
debate the permissibility of contracting under lex mercatoria. 
A second possibility that may be ruled out of the lex mercatoria debate 
through the insulation of deal dynamics from critical purview is the prospect 
that critical “conflicts” in conflict-of-laws (as private international law is 
sometimes called) might be located elsewhere than that debate’s most 
commonly drawn front lines, namely the line between insatiable global capital 
and an ever-more-emasculated state, that between one nation-state and another 
(often, a “developed” nation and a “developing” one), and that between the 
mercatocratic elite and the rest. To reread the vagaries of a transnational 
corporate deal is to recall that fault lines periodically open within the 
“autonomous personhood” of a corporate party, just as they frequently do 
within the “autonomous personhood” of any one member of the mercatocracy. 
Consider conflicts between, say, an associate and a partner, fellow associates, or 
a lawyer and an administrative assistant. Consider conflicts within the elite in a 
 
 115. Recall the promise, made earlier in this article, to remain loyal to the pragmatic intuitions of 
the discipline of private international law. 
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particular city, and between elites from different professions and geographic 
settings, vested with different types and degrees of elitism. Consider conflicts 
within the personhood of the lawyer or those internal to the styles of business 
or corporate lawyering. These conflicts may be as or more material to the 
realization or frustration of corporate “choice” than those that private 
international law customarily navigates. And the tensions at work in these 
conflicts may operate in defiance of conventional mappings of core and 
periphery, freedom and constraint, law and politics.116 To locate questions 
surrounding party autonomy after the deal is to negate the maneuverability of 
these conflicts and their materiality in the constitution and consolidation of 
“autonomous” positions. 
Yet, for all the blind spots borne by private international law, perhaps 
commentators and practitioners might yet amplify—perhaps even make 
pragmatic use of—its inclination to register and approach conflict. Where a 
public international lawyer is more inclined to see a “higher” commonality or 
“mere” politics, the private international lawyer tends to see difference—
difference in and to the law that is not always amenable to being managed or 
massaged away. Might a disinclination to avoid conflict per se get ruled in when 
we approach an issue as a private-international-law matter?117 If so, this 
predilection, combined with the richness of the legal-realist legacy, may yet 
equip private international lawyers to navigate some of the banal and complex 
“interiors” of party autonomy in a corporate context. Private-international-law 
scholars, lamenting the demise of their discipline in the face of legislative and 
treaty harmonization,118 may yet find in the architecture of autonomous choice a 
plethora of material conflicts in which lawyers are already active. These may 
not be of a kind amenable to codification, litigation, or reform in conventional 
terms. Nevertheless, private international lawyers could still ask, in and of these 
domains, the sort of pragmatic questions that they readily ask of private 
international law’s judicial and legislative development: What is the price of 
 
 116. One way of coming to grips with such conflicts in methodological terms is offered by Holmes 
and Marcus, who seek to track the production of “illicit, marginal social thought” within technocratic 
milieu in terms of a “para-ethnographic dimension” of domains of expertise. Douglas R. Holmes & 
George E. Marcus, Cultures of Expertise and the Management of Globalization: Toward the Re-
Functioning of Ethnography, in GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND ETHICS AS 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 235, 236–37 (Aihwa Ong & Stephen J. Collier eds., 2005). 
 117. Indeed, as Michaels highlights, private-international-law issues can even inspire political 
passion at times. Ralf Michaels, EU Law as Private International Law? Reconceptualising the Country-
of-Origin Principle as Vested-Rights Theory, 2 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 195 (2006) (noting that “people all 
over Europe took to the streets to protest against a proposed norm of private international law—the 
‘country-of-origin’ principle stated in Article 16 of the proposed services directive”). 
 118. See, e.g., C.G.J. Morse, Making English Private International Law, in REFORM AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR PETER NORTH 273 
(James Fawcett ed., 2002) (on legislative developments); Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira, The EU and 
a Metamorphosis of Private International Law, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR PETER NORTH, supra, at 111 (on the effect of EC 
treaty-based law). 
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“autonomy” in contractual choice of law; which costs or interests should matter 
in the assessment of that price; and who pays that price in each instance? 
V 
CONCLUSION 
To enliven the “private” of private international law is to extend legal 
inquiry to what is at stake in private international law seeking to depict, 
consolidate, validate, redistribute, augment, co-opt, or circumscribe private 
power. This article has highlighted that there are significant stakes at issue 
before the question of what private international lawyers should do in the face 
of question-begging concentrations of private power. In their vital role in the 
framing and enactment of that power, lawyers advising on private-international-
law issues have been and are already engaged in the contentious business of 
allocating resources and authority. Moreover, the mode of that engagement is 
mostly far removed from measured weighing and balancing. Accordingly, 
drawing inspiration from the work of Robert Hale and Walter Wheeler Cook, 
among others, this article has cautioned against the reading of “autonomous” 
legal decisions by multinational corporations as instances of congealed power in 
private international law. In the stylized setting of a cross-border deal, this 
article has instead depicted the performative enactment of autonomous choice 
in all its tawdry, collective routinization. In so doing, it has suggested 
establishing as both politically significant and worthy of legal scholarly attention 
the very terms in which such “choices” are formulated and articulated, and to 
recapture some sense of the persistent undecidedness of that articulation. 
